After the restoration of Azerbaijan’s state sovereignty, Abulfaz Elcibay was elected president in June 1992, whose presidency lasted until the end of June 1993. Heydar Aliyev returned to power again and was elected president in 1993.

Despite the ongoing state of war, triggered by Armenia’s armed aggression, President Heydar Aliyev put an end to the political chaos in the country and formed a political system and a legal basis to secure the future development of the country. The constitution was adopted in 1995.

In conformity with the priorities set forth in the constitution, the legal basis has been created for free and regular elections on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by free and secret ballot. Since 1997 the Azerbaijani government has been closely cooperating with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to form the electoral legislation that meets the international standards.

After joining the Council of the Europe, Azerbaijan’s framework of cooperation has further expanded and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has joined this process. Thanks to this cooperation and for the unification of the electoral legislation, the Election Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan was adopted in May 2003. At that time, this Election Code was highly appreciated by the international organizations. A Joint Final Assessment by the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ ODIHR stated that the Election Code provides comprehensive framework for the conduct of elections and referenda and, in most respects, appears to meet international standards and best practices.

In accordance with the constitution, presidential and parliamentary elections are held every five years. Following the 2016 referendum on the amendments to the constitution, the term of office of president in Azerbaijan has increased from five to seven years. In the context of the abovementioned, until recently, OSCE reports were highlighting that “the election will be held in an ongoing conflict situation with Armenia, and the occupation of significant part of Azerbaijani territories, and a huge number of internally displaced persons obstruct the administration of elections”.

As a matter of fact, the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) in charge of observing the elections in the Republic of Azerbaijan is usually made up of the OSCE’s Office for the Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODI­ HR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament (EP) and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA). The NATO PA has not been observing the elections in Azerbaijan since the 2005 parliamentary elections.

The election observation missions of the OSCE/ODIHR, PACE, EP, and the OSCE PA monitored the parliamentary elections in 2010 and the presidential elections in 2008 and 2013 years. Following the EP, the OSCE/ODIHR and the OSCE PA made a decision not to send the election observation mission for the 2015 parliamentary elections. The PACE election observation mission was the only official Western mission to observe the 2015 parliamentary elections and the 2016 referendum on the amendments to the constitution. In 2018, the election observation missions of the OSCE/ODIHR, the PACE and the OSCE PA observed the presidential elections, except the EP.

Incumbent President Mr. Ilham Aliyev was elected president of Azerbaijan in 2003 by 77% of the votes. In 2008, Mr. Ilham Aliyev got reelected for the second term. A report of the OSCE/ ODIHR in this regard reads: “Significant progress was made in addressing the OSCE commitments and other international standards.”

Along with the observation missions of the influential international organizations, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament (EP) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the observation mission of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human  Rights observed the 2013 presidential election in Azerbaijan as well Overall, the 2013 presidential election was observed by over 50,000 domestic observers and about 1,400 international  observers from some 100 countries, representing various regions of the world. The international observers were representing all regions of the world, including the U.S. and most of the European countries.

During the 2013 presidential election in Azerbaijan, Mr. Michel Voisin (France) was appointed the Special Coordinator by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office to lead the short-term observation mission of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Mr. Robert Walter (United Kingdom) was heading the PACE delegation. Mr. Pino Arlacchi (Italy), member of the Socialist Group, led the European Parliament’s observation mission. Ms. Tana de Zulueta (Italy) was appointed the head of OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM) that started on 28 August 2013.

Except for the OSCE/ODIHR observation mission, all other observation missions and groups assessed the 9 October 2013 presidential election as free, transparent and fair, noting progress towards democracy. Europe’s most influential international institutions, namely, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European Parliament (EP) observation missions issued a joint statement on the outcome of the elections.

The statement read: “We did not come to Azerbaijan to give lessons, but rather to observe the democratic principles and the election”. The statement highlighted that “the elections marked a free, fair and transparent process and a progress towards democracy that was in line with the OSCE and CoE standards”.

Welcoming the invitation by the Azerbaijani government of a large number of observers, these two influential organizations in a joint statement also highlighted  that the electoral procedures ahead of and on the election day had been carried out in a professional and peaceful manner, and no actions of intimidation were registered at or close to the polling stations on the voting day, no police presence around the polling stations was observed and electoral debates were more open as against the previous elections.

One of the noteworthy aspects is that the position of the OSCE PA observation mission almost coincided with the position of the PACE and the European Parliament observation missions on the outcome of the election. This position found its reflection in the 10 October statement of Mr. Michel Voisin, Special Coordinator of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and the head of the OSCE observation mission, which stated that”… this campaign has undeniably been a democratic advance by the number of candidates, an open for all television campaigning, a remark­ able participation in the elections of more than 72 percent, good preliminary work and transparency in the way the Central Election Commission has organized these elections”.

In his statement, the head of the OSCE observation mission highlighted that he considered the election transparent, free and honest and that fully endorsed the conclusions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. Mr. Michel Voisin also brought to the attention that the OSCE/ODIHR report did not reflect the positive aspects as noted by the observers of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE in the short-term observation mission.

Interestingly, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Mr. Leonid Kozhara made a statement on the outcome of the election. In his statement, he welcomed the fact that the presidential election was monitored by a large number of observers from authoritative international organizations, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States and others, as well as by many national delegations from the OSCE Participating States. Mr. Leonid Kozhara also drew attention to the statement of the Special Coordinator of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, the joint statement made by the election observation delegations of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, as well as the statements by other international observers.

He highlighted that in the statements, the international observers concluded that a number of aspects of the conduct of the 2013 presidential election showed progress towards meeting the OSCE and the Council of Europe commitments and other international standards for democratic elections.

I also regret to note that the assessment of the OSCE/ODIHR observation mission on the results of the election was radically different. The report alleged that the document was prepared by joint efforts of the OSCE/ODIHR and the OSCE PA.

The head of the OSCE PA observation mission, Michel Voisin, opposed these allegations voiced in the OSCE/ODIHR report at the Standing Committee Meeting during the OSCE PA session in Budva, Montenegro, on 13-15 October 2013. Michel Voisin unequivocally stated that members of the OSCE PA observation mission had not taken part in the preparation of this document. He also stressed that he himself did not either take part in the preparation, but was involved in the discussion, and opposed the adopted document.

One of the noteworthy aspects is that the report of the OSCE/ ODIHR included only the negative considerations regarding the electoral process. However, these considerations were not substantiated with proofs and evidence. For example, absurd allegations, such as “intimidation of candidates and voters” were put forward, but failed to be confirmed with any proof. Negative assessment of electoral processes in 11% of the polling stations was also doubtful. Accordingly, with over 5,300 polling stations in Azerbaijan, there were a total of 280 observers in the OSCE/ODIHR observation mission. If we are convinced by the allegations, it means that ODIHR observers noticed violations during vote counting process in nearly 600 polling stations. The figure that 280 observers participated in the electoral and vote counting processes in 600 polling stations was also doubtful.

It is very interesting that when Chairman of the Central Election Commission (CEC) Mazahir Panahov at a meeting with Tana de Zulueta, the head  of the OSCE/ODIHR observation mission, asked to justify the allegations, she could not manage to present any evidence or proof.

Despite the positive assessment of the election by the PACE, the EP, the OSCE PA observation missions, by the OSCE Chairperson and by the numerous observation groups from different countries, it was regrettable that those wishing to exert political pressure on Azerbaijan were only referring to the assessment of the OSCE/ODIHR observation mission.

In this regard, I would like to note that from political point of view, the PACE and the European Parliament are more important institutions. These institutions reflect the positions and opinions about Azerbaijan of the European Union, the heart of integrational processes into Europe, and the Council of Europe, the house of human rights. On the other hand, members of PACE, EP and OSCE PA observation missions are well-known public and political figures, elected by voters to represent their countries’ national parliaments; and as a rule, they have sufficient knowledge about the electoral processes.

As a matter of fact, members of the OSCE/ODIHR observation mission are usually middle-and-low-ranking officials, representing the OSCE member states. Usually, they have insufficient knowledge of the electoral processes. In several cases, these people are unaware of the situation at all, and as a rule, low-ranking officials of ODIHR are obliged to unconditionally implement the instructions of high-ranking officials. Therefore, they are prone to fall under influence for this or other way. Hence, it was not understandable that some forces preferred the assessment of the OSCE/ODIHR observation mission.

The objective of the OSCE/ODIHR’s biased assessment was to trigger provocations by the opposition, to undermine stability in the country and damage Azerbaijan’s positive image internationally. I would like to focus on a point on the outcome of the elections. An observation mission of 120 influential public and political figures, former and current congressmen and senators from the U.S.A. monitored the election and issued a positive statement.

According to the monitoring results, carried out by the West­ Resource Public Union to Support Civil Society Development, funded directly by the U.S. embassy to Azerbaijan, in 450 polling stations across the country’s 69 constituencies within  the framework of the project, and including by the North region coordinator of the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center, an Azerbaijani NGO, which was referred to in the OSCE/ODIHR report, in six constituencies, Mr. Ilham Aliyev won the election with outright victory of 81-85% percent across the country’s 75 constituencies out of 125.

At the same time, according to the exit poll results by Arthur J. Finkelstein & Associates, one of the top 10 survey firms in the U.S., and Opinion Way, France’s Research Institute, it was confirmed that Mr. llham Aliyev garnered 83.7% and 84.9% per­ cent, respectively. However, the OSCE/ODIHR did not want to accept this reality.

Despite libels and slanders, the naked truth is that Azerbaijan is a country where numerous ethnic and religious groups live in peace and harmony; in the history of the country, there has never been any conflict on either ethnic, or religious grounds, and Azerbaijan is one of the countries in the world that can be shown as an example for its national, ethnic and religious tolerance. ‘This biased and fact-free report of the OSCE/ODIHR pursued a single aim, i.e. to fulfil instructions of high-ranking officials, to serve interests of powerful states with regard to Azerbaijan, to form a negative image of Azerbaijan in the international arena and to compel it through libels and slanders to give up the occupied lands.

With the analyses at hand, I tried to impartially comment on developments unfolding at European institutions concerning Azerbaijan and reveal their real essence without being under the sway of emotions and in an impartial manner.

My key objective was to examine the reasons for the ongoing criticism of and pressures on Azerbaijan by European institutions over various issues and gauge to what extent the criticism and pressure on Azerbaijan are objective.

The analyses of the developments show that as a rule, Azerbaijan has been subject to continuous criticism by European institutions mainly over the issue of political prisoners, for the results of the presidential and parliamentary elections and referenda the country have held up to now.

The information presented demonstrates that European parliamentary institutions are at best indifferent to the ongoing occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other territories of Azerbaijan by Armenia. And they do not often distinguish between the aggressor state and the victim of the aggression. In most cases, they defend the aggressor state Armenia under trumped-up provocations of the Armenian diaspora and the state of Armenia without taking into account the international legal norms.

The analyses of the visible and invisible aspects of the debates on these three important issues, and of the developments taking place around the debates show that the criticism and pressures against Azerbaijan were not coincidental and chaotic in nature. The criticism was very well planned and conducted in a systematic way by a single center of the pro-Armenian and anti-Azerbaijani forces. These criticisms have been continuous, and their intensity has changed depending on the topicality of issues put on the agenda and have been an integral part of the long-term anti-Azerbaijani strategy.

In order to realize their anti-Azerbaijani strategy, they conspired with NGOs funded from the single center, regularly spread information that was biased and full of hatred and wide of the mark, thus, trying to damage the international standing of Azerbaijan.

Retrospective analyses of the developments show that the anti-Azerbaijani forces, who were seriously annoyed by Azerbaijan’s successes at PACE, formulated a strategy against Azerbaijan and made regular attempts to implement it. Being convinced of the impossibility of achieving their malicious plans against Azerbaijan through putting reports on the agenda of European organizations, namely through internationally recognized democratic vote, they chose a new strategy – by putting forward groundless allegations of corruption against Azerbaijan, to cast a doubt on the impartiality of the decisions made at PACE and to bring these issues back on the agenda.

Undoubtedly, it has been a primary objective to put back on the agenda the issue of political prisoners, which is the most effective instrument of influencing any PACE member state, including Azerbaijan. After the rejection of Mr. Strasser’s biased report, stipulating the presence of political prisoners in Azerbaijan at a plenary meeting of the 2013 January session of PACE, the anti-Azerbaijani and pro-Armenian forces at PACE prepared new strategies in order to gain new opportunities of political influence on Azerbaijan. And at the heart of all new strategies was the revival by all means of the so-called issue of political prisoners and use it against Azerbaijan.

The anti-Azerbaijani forces, who were disappointed by the rejection of Mr. Strasser’s report, began to form an opinion, alleging that the achievement for the preparation  of the report “On the escalation of tension in Nagorno-Karabakh  and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan” and the adoption of the Resolution 2085 (2016) “On  the deliberate deprivation of inhabitants of frontier regions of Azerbaijan from water” were possible thanks to bribing PACE members by the Azerbaijani authorities. As I (Elkhan Suleymanov) and my colleague Muslum Mammadov were distinguished by our special activities in achieving successes in the name of Azerbaijan, the allegations were put forward against us. In order to make these allegations seem reliable, it was claimed that the rejection of Mr. Strasser’s report was possible in exchange for money allegedly given to former PACE member Mr. Luca Volonte by me.

However, even though on 27 January 2017, the Milan Court declared the absence of conditions for the proceedings against Luca Volonte in relation to the offence of corruption claim through the exercise of this function, the PACE Bureau, on the same day, decided to set up an Independent External Investigation Body.

This decision of the Bureau once again proved that Europe is playing a dirty “democracy” game against Azerbaijan. Thus, to bring back the issue of the political prisoners to the agenda and to turn Azerbaijan into the political battlefield were standing behind the establishment of the Investigation Body to look into the allegations of corruption  within PACE and  the anti­Azerbaijani forces were mobilized to this end. Finally, I would like to highlight that Azerbaijan’s recent achievements in PACE, particularly, the rejection of Strasser’s biased report in 2013, the adoption of Sarsang Resolution on the occupation of our territories, the assessment of recent elections in Azerbaijan as democratic, free and transparent by international organizations had seriously annoyed the anti-Azerbaijani forces. Those forces tried to revive the allegations of political prisoners in Azerbaijan under different pretexts and tricks.

In this dirty game, they have no respect for any of the declared European values, and the discrimination against Azerbaijan, inefficiency of the rule of law principle, putting legal issues on the agenda without taking heed of court decisions are considered normal.

The appointment of a rapporteur on the political prisoners in Azerbaijan at PACE after the approval of the report of the Independent  External Investigation Body once again showed that our analyses and predictions, though regrettable, were not groundless and justified.

In unison with PACE, the adoption by the European Parliament of the recommendations containing conditions for the ratification of the EU-Azerbaijan comprehensive cooperation agreement showed that the strategy against Azerbaijan is not limited to only PACE.

P.S. I feel compelled to bring to the attention of the readers that as I exposed the dirty “democracy” game of Europe through these analyses, I will be subjected to strong persecution and pressures in the future.

FOREWORD

CHAPTER ONE

PACE’s POLITICAL PRISONERS PROBLEM

1.1. PACE provisional criteria on “political prisoners” serving certain predetermined objectives

1.2. The position of Azerbaij an in PACE to war ds the resolution of the “political prisoners” problem

1.3. Special Rapporteur Christoph Stràsser chooses the path of “war” rather than cooperation with Azerbaijan

1.4. Strasser’s tactical maneuvers and threats against Azerbaijan

1.5. The decision that undermined PACE’s credibility: The criteria for political prisoners passed by 89-89 votes

1.6. The day of Azerbaijan in PACE: Strasser’s biased report rejected

CHAPTER TWO

OCCUPATION BY ARMENIA OF AZERBAIJAN’S NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND OTHER TERRITORIES ON PACE’s AGENDA

2.1. The consequences of the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and other territories of Azerbaijan by Armenia: A brief summary

2.2.1. Emergency situation triggered by occupation of the Sarsang water reservoir and its discussion at the international level

2.2.2. Appointment of a PACE rapporteur on the Sarsang water reservoir

2.3. Nagorno-Karabakh and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan on PACE’s agenda

2.4. Aggravation of tension in the occupied territories, preparation and discussion of reports on the Sarsang water reservoir

2.4.1. Rapporteurs are facing pressure by Armenia and PACE’s Secretariat

2.4.2. Confrontations over Monitoring Committee report are of far-reaching ramifications

2.4.3. Committees approve reports

2.4.4. The final stage of the struggle for the approval of the reports

2.5. Pressure continuous against PACE members recognizing Armenia as an aggressor

CHAPTER THREE

ELECTIONS IN AZERBAIJAN AND OFFICIAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSIONS OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS

3.1. Distorted position of the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) on the elections in Azerbaijan

3.2. Maidan plans devised for Baku fail

3.3. A campaign for isolation of Azerbaijan is under way in the European Parliament

3.4. The PACE mission as the only official European observation mission in the 2015 parliamentary elections

3.5. OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) reports are biased

3.6. OSCE/ODIHR EOM reports are result of copy-and-paste approach

3.7. Suspicious collaboration between OSCE/ODIHR and George Soros

3.8. European parliamentary institutions are vulnerable to pressure of the OSCE/ODIHR

CHAPTER FOUR

MAJOR SOURCES OF CLAIMS OF CORRUPTION AGAINST AZERBAIJAN

4.1. Alliance of a group of international NGOs against Azerbaijan

4.2. Anti-Azerbaijani network and traces of Soros inside PACE

4.3. Post-Strässer wave of political prisoners allegations against Azerbaijan

4.4. Establishment of the Independent External Investigation Body on allegations of corruption within PACE

4.5. Hidden moments of the Independent Investigation Body report on allegations of corruption within PACE

4.6. The Independent External Investigation Body report passed… intentions shed light on

In lieu of an epilogue

Thirty-six PACE MPs, mainly from the Western European countries, submitted a document to the Bureau in spring and summer of 2011. In this document, they demanded that the preparations of the documents on defining the notion of the political prisoner, as well as the follow-up to the issue of political prisoners should be entrusted to different rapporteurs. Finally, fresh discussions on the issue of the political prisoners were held at the meeting of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on 5 October 2011. The discussions proceeded in a very heated atmosphere. During the discussions, Committee Chairperson Mr. Christos Pourgourides and other members of the Committee from Spain and France made speeches.

Mr. Pourgourides, in his speech, underlined the readiness of the Azerbaijani government to cooperate with the rapporteur on political prisoners. He also drew attention to the fact that the Azerbaijani government was surprised and frustrated to find out that only Azerbaijan among 47 member states was chosen on the issue of the political prisoner. Mr. Pourgourides noted that the application of the report on the political prisoners only to Azerbaijan really served as a reason for double standards and discrimination. Therefore, he proposed to name the report not as “Reconsideration of the issue of political prisoners in Azerbaijan”, but “The investigation of the issue of political prisoners”.

The proposal was put to vote and accepted by an absolute majority vote with 2 MPs against. As a result of the voting, the Committee decided to investigate the issue of political prisoner not only in Azerbaijan, but also in all member states of the Council of Europe.

At first sight, justice was restored thanks to the 10-year intensive efforts of the Azerbaijani government and the delegation of Azerbaijan. Thus, the name of the report was already changed and the investigation into the issue of the political prisoners without any discrimination in all member states of the Council of Europe was put on the agenda. Though the approval of such a decision resulted in the inclusion in the agenda of the investigation of the issue of political prisoners without any discrimination among the PACE member states, it did not prevent discrimination against Azerbaijan. Thus, Mr. Christoph Strässer was steadily stressing the absence of a need for the definition of the legal criteria for the notion of “political prisoners”, and that political prisoners should only be followed up in Azerbaijan.

A few weeks passed since the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights took a decision to change the name of the report on political prisoners dated from 5 October 2011. In November, as a result of Strässer’s efforts, the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid of the German Bundestag adopted a declaration on the human rights situation in Azerbaijan. The declaration was completely against Azerbaijan. The document cast a doubt on the honoring of obligations and commitments taken by Azerbaijan before the Council of Europe.

Moreover, it was noted that the October decision of the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on changing the name of the report on the investigation of the issue of political prisoners was adopted “in response to Baku’s demand”. By saying that the members of the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights approved the decision “in response to Baku’s demand” by an absolute majority vote with one vote against, the Bundestag Committee cast a doubt on the competency of the PACE Committee and its members.

The declaration claimed that Azerbaijan refused to cooperate with Mr. Strässer, PACE rapporteur on political prisoners. In the document of the Bundestag Committee, it was said that though “the limitation on the issue of the political prisoners, set only to Azerbaijan, was abolished in response to Baku’s de mand”; Azerbaijan again did not issue a visa to the rapporteur on the political prisoners and made “him to postpone his visit to the country”. In its declaration, the Committee called on the PACE “to advice Azerbaijan to immediately allow the entry of the Council of Europe’s rapporteur on political prisoners, Mr.Christoph Strässer, into the country and to provide all necessary support for him to carry out his mandate” and “carry out comprehensive measures to oblige Azerbaijan to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”.

On 28-29 October 2011, Azadliq newspaper carried an interview with Strässer, titled “Strässer threatened the authorities with sanctions”. In his interview, he openly disclosed his position over the issue; serious allegations were put forward not only against the Azerbaijani authorities, but also members of PACE and the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, including members of the German Bundestag.

In the interview, Mr. Strässer expressed his disagreement with regard to the 5 October 2011 decision of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on changing the name of the report on the political prisoners, and also drew attention to the fact that the decision had been taken in his absence.

He explained his position in the following way: “Let me express my position that I do not agree with this compromise. This is not such a pleasant outcome. This compromise was adopted in my absence. Therefore, I express my protest and note that I do not agree with it”. Mr. Strässer noted that, “I was displeased with processes taking place in PACE”. Accusing PACE members of setting up groups, he said “currently, efforts are made to establish groups over these issues and this is not acceptable”.

Along with this, Mr. Strässer stressed that although Azerbaijan’s name was excluded from the report, anyway, the talk will be about the political prisoners in Azerbaijan. The rapporteur, though he did not visit Azerbaijan up until now, was saying that his list contained names of 100 political prisoners in the country.

The rapporteur’s peculiar interpretation of the decision by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights and his claims, without doing any research into the existence of a certain amount of political prisoners, once more proved his biased and prejudiced stance on the issue. Threatening the Azerbaijani government in his interview, Mr. Strässer said that “the report in the pipeline would not be positive for Azerbaijan”. It was evident outright that Mr. Strässer, against expectations of him, was unwilling to become a neutral referee and to arrange a neutral fact-finding mission.

Furthermore, in his interview, Mr. Strässer noted that the Azerbaijani government’s lobby groups and groups close to it in the Western Europe obstructed his activities. At the same time, he claimed that the document prepared by the parliamentarians had been stolen from the intranet system of the German Bundestag. We should note that Mr. Strässer not only seriously accused Bundestag MPs of stealing documents, but also telling lies. Thus, on 24 March 2011, Mr. Strässer asked the socialist MPs of the German Bundestag to sign a petition against Azerbaijan on the issue of political prisoners. However, he himself did not sign this petition. Explaining his position on this issue to his colleagues, he wrote: “I cannot sign this petition on the ground of neutrality, as I am a PACE rapporteur.” He even asked the Bundestag members to keep secret that he had prepared the text of the petition and organized a relevant campaign. As obvious, Mr. Strässer was very well-aware of violating the norms of impartiality of the PACE rapporteur. Therefore, the document in question was not the resolution prepared by the Bundestag members, contrary to what Mr. Strässer said in the interview with Azadliq newspaper. As was noted above in that document, this political initiative was not put forward by other MPs, but by Mr. Strässer himself and by doing so, he deliberately violated the principle of neutrality.

The 28-29 October issues of Azadliq newspaper reported that “European MP (Strässer) exposed tricks of the Azerbaijani government”. So, in his interview with the newspaper, Mr. Strässer openly accused some former MPs from several European countries, as well as from Berlin, of corruption, considering it as a sign of the organized crime. He claimed that “Azerbaijan’s lobbyists made strenuous efforts to bribe members of the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights”. Then, realizing that he could only speak on his behalf, he admitted that “as to me, I can say that Azerbaijanis have never offered me a bribe”.

Obviously, such scandalous and outright statement without any proof and even without an element of a proof was an accusation full of slander against Azerbaijan and cast a doubt on impartiality of the members of the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. These claims by Mr. Strässer led to such an impression that everybody, who objectively assesses Azerbaijan’s position, including members of the Committee, was allegedly bribed by Azerbaijan. Thus, it was doubtless that Mr. Strässer ‘s groundless allegations were biased and deliberate step directed against Azerbaijan’s international reputation, and they were aimed at undermining the Azerbaijani government’s business interests.

In order to make it clear for the public opinion, Mr. Strässer again threatened the Azerbaijani authorities in his interview and noted that “the report in the pipeline would not be in favor of Azerbaijan”. As a whole, the cases proving Mr. Strässer’s biased position against Azerbaijan and his groundless allegations against our country had a wider extend.

We should underline that later more serious and scandalous circumstances appeared with regard to Mr. Strässer’s interview. Thus, Mr. Strässer’s own website said that he had never granted an interview to Azadliq newspaper. It was noted that Mr. Strässer participated in the conference dedicated to the 20th independence anniversary of the Azerbaijani state in Berlin and made a speech with regard to the mandate given to him by the PACE on the political prisoners. He was quoted as saying that his speech was presented as an interview without his knowledge.

However, denying what were said by Mr. Strässer ‘s web-site, Qanimat Zahid, the editor-in-chief of Azadliq newspaper, told Yeni Musavat newspaper on 15 November 2011 that “all the views reflected in the newspaper entirely belonged to Mr. Strässer “.

Besides, Azadliq newspaper carried an article on 16 November 2011, titled “Has Mr. Strässer granted an interview to Azadliq?” In the article, journalist Fikrat Huseynli, who prepared Mr. Strässer ‘s scandalous interview, full of biased accusations, shed light on all the points with regard to the situation. He noted that Mr. Strässer ‘s denial of his interview was groundless and wide of the mark. Mr. Fikrat Huseynli of Azadliq newspaper underlined that Mr. Strässer ‘s speech at the conference, the questions he was asked over his speech, and answers to those questions, and the correspondent’s conversation with Mr. Strässer after the conference were recorded, and the audio was available. Besides, journalist Fikrat Huseynli said that once after the interview was ready, he contacted Mr. Strässer’s office and “was given the go-ahead” for the publication of the interview as “there was no problem”.

Thus, there were grey areas and dark moments around Strässer ‘s interview to Azadliq newspaper, titled “Strässer threatened the government with sanctions” dated from 28-29 October 2011. Mr. Strässer, on the one hand, put forward groundless and biased accusations against Azerbaijan and without visiting the country in the absence of any fact-finding mission and finally, without any discussions at the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, he on behalf of the Council of Europe demonstrated his personal anti-Azerbaijani position. On the other hand, Mr. Strässer claimed that he had not given any interview to Azadliq newspaper and distanced himself from the views sounded there. Thirdly, Azadliq newspaper  stressed that views belonged entirely to Mr. Strässer and drew attention to evidence to prove them.

After this important decision of the Committee, the Azerbaijani authorities started preparations for Mr. Strässer’s visit in line with his mandate, as well as to determine the agenda of the visit. However, just at this time, Mr. Strässer’s abovementioned interview, titled “Strässer threatened the government with sanctions”, was published in the 28-29 October issues of Azadliq newspaper. Thanks to Strässer’s efforts, in November 2011, the declaration on the situation of human rights in Azerbaijan was adopted by the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid of the German Bundestag.

As was obvious, Mr. Strässer declared a large-scale “war” against Azerbaijan. Within the framework of the campaign of war, there emerged claims that Azerbaijan refused from cooperation with the special rapporteur on the political prisoners, Mr. Strässer, and the “rapporteur was again refused a visa and “he was obliged to postpone his visit to the country”. And this “war” already started to bear fruits. Some media outlets were carrying fake reports, claiming that Mr. Strässer was not allowed to visit Azerbaijan, feeding the public with wrong and tendentious information. Whereas during the 7 November 2010 parliamentary election, Strässer already visited Azerbaijan as an election observer and did not have any visa problem.

We should note that despite Strässer’s prejudiced, ill-intentioned anti-Azerbaijani stance, the head of the Azerbaijani parliamentary delegation, MP Samad Seyidov, in a letter sent to the PACE leadership said that Azerbaijan was ready to discuss Strässer’s visit to Azerbaijan in 2012 for the discussion of the alleged political prisoners issue. Regrettably, being aware of theletter to the PACE leadership, Mr. Strässer continued his anti-Azerbaijani activities and misinformed the European parlia mentarians and the public, feeding them with false ana unreal information.

Undoubtedly, given the existing situation, there emerged such a question: after the abovementioned events, could Strâsser be an unbiased and neutral arbitrator in his capacity as a rapporteur? Can we believe that Strâsser will demonstrate an unbiased position? And is it possible to establish trusty constructive cooperation with him?

Finally, on 26 January 2012, on the initiative of Mr. Strâsser, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights held hearings on the topic of “Reconsideration of the issue of political prisoners”. Initiated by Mr. Christoph Strâsser, the Committee invited three NGO leaders from Azerbaijan to the hearings to speak in their capacities as experts. In their speeches, the NGO leaders noted that the criteria on the notion of “political prisoner” were not adopted and the appointment of the rapporteur on the political prisoners only in Azerbaijan made the Azerbaijani government justifiably dissatisfied.

They told members of the Committee that Mr. Christoph Strâsser had not established cooperation with Azerbaijanibased NGOs during his tenure as the rapporteur, and consequently, the issue in question reached an impasse.

Mr. Sadaddinov, an NGO representative, also said that for two years, Mr. Christoph Strâsser had not responded to any of his letters. The experts noted that, first of all, the criteria applicable to all member states should be prepared for the solution of the issue, the reports should be prepared for all member states; and on this issue, and no legal, bureaucratic, procedural obstacles should be created for any member states.

Addressing the hearings, the expert of the Azerbaijani government analyzed the Memorandum submitted to the Committee by Mr. Christoph Strâsser on 23 January 2012. In the Memorandum, though the issue for a number of member countries was resolved at the Monitoring Committee, he drew attention to biased opinions that for Azerbaijan, the issue was referred to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, asking them for reasons why the issue for other countries is resolved at the Monitoring Committee, whereas for Azerbaijan, it is referred to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights? What is the reason for the discrimination against Azerbaijan? Why are the fundamental principles of the Council of Europe, such as the equality of the member states and the rule of law, violated vis-a-vis Azerbaijan?

He asked why for three years, Mr. Strässer, as the rapporteur, had established relations neither with the Azerbaijani government, the Azerbaijani delegation to PACE, the leading human rights organizations of the country, nor different opposition parties. Instead, he waged a campaign against Azerbaijan. He gave an interview to Azadliq newspaper, arranged hearings at the German Bundestag. He made groundless allegations against Azerbaijan, European MEPs collaborating with Azerbaijan, and members of the German Bundestag, and now he claims that he is not issued a visa to visit Azerbaijan to deliver on his mandate.

During the speech, it was noted that the rapporteurs of theMonitoring Committee visited the country without any obstacles. Azerbaijan is a member of numerous international organizations and fulfils its commitments. Thus, Mr. Strässer’s allegation that he is not issued a visa is wide of the mark. Consequently, he has lost his neutrality and trust in him as a rapporteur.

Monitoring Committee’s co-rapporteur on Azerbaijan Mr.Pedro Agramunt noted that in a few days, he would pay a visit to Azerbaijan accompanied by a Maltese co-rapporteur without a visa problem. He underlined that he had made a number of achievements in the release of presumed political prisoners as the implementation of a fact-finding mission on political prisoners was a main component of his mandate.

He also expressed his concern about the double nature of Mr.Strässer’s mandate that only caused confusion. To recap, he said that he had asked the Azerbaijani government for the release of the remaining 17 young men, named by Amnesty International, and got a positive respond, adding that this issue was under consideration of the Justice Ministry.

Further, members of the Committee spoke. Except for two German MPs, the majority of the speakers focused on the importance of preparing the criteria for the definition of the “political prisoners” applicable to all member states, defining the notion of the “political prisoners” and dividing the reports on the follow-up to the issue of the political prisoners in member states.

It was noted that the Council of Europe should open a new chapter on this issue and start from scratch and eliminate duplications between the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights and Monitoring Committee.

The common mood that formed during the hearings was that the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights should focus on “legal” issues rather than on fact-finding mission to the country, which falls under the mandate of the Monitoring Committee. Duality should be avoided. On the other hand, there is an urgent need for a legal report on the criteria and definition; therefore, the current report should at least be divided. Finally, any additional information on presumed political prisoners should be taken into consideration for all member states without exception and on continuous basis.

The former president of the Parliamentary Assembly, Mr.Mevlut Cavusoglu, summarized the discussion in his capacity as the last speaker at the meeting. He said: “I think we should open a new chapter on this issue. In my opinion, the report should either be divided into two parts, or the reporter should resign”.

After these words, the chairman gave the floor to Mr. Strässer to have the last word. However, despite the chairman’s surprise, asking “Mr. Strässer, have you lost your voice?” he did not find anything to say. In general, the 26 January 2012 hearings, as well as open protests against the rapporteur’s proposals were asignificant step forward. Thus, for the first time in three years,open discussions were held at the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, and Strässer’s position became a target of a severe criticism.

The majority of the Committee members urged not to make the issue a laughingstock and put an end to applying a solution to the follow-up to the political prisoners only in one member state in the context of the fact-finding mission of the Monitoring Committee, as well as to call on the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to establish a legal framework applicable to all member states without discrimination.

At the end of this hearing, distrust towards Mr. Strässer was to an extent that Mr. Strässer was offered to withdraw from his mandate. However, at the end of the meeting as Mr. Christopher Chope said, “Mr. Strässer lost his voice”. Though proposals calling for the resignation of Mr. Strässer, he did not express his position on this offer and later continued his activities as a rapporteur.

The chairman of the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Mr. Christopher Chope, sent a letter to the head of Azerbaijani delegation on 6 February 2012. He asked to allow the rapporteur to pay a fact-finding visit to Azerbaijan in April 2012 within the framework of the report “On reconsideration of the issue of political prisoners”.

In his response to the Committee chairman, the head of the delegation stressed that Azerbaijan was ready to cooperate with any rapporteur on any report as a commitment to be fulfilled by any member state. In order “to be fully prepared for this visit and to work on the agenda, as well as to arrange the meetings, he asked for information on the visit, the rapporteur would like to pay.

After the meeting of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights in Paris on 12 March 2012, the head of the Azerbaijani delegation to PACE, Mr. Samad Seyidov, sent a letter to Mr. Strässer confirming that he was invited to Azerbaijan for preparing his report “On reconsideration of the issue of the political prisoners” as “was discussed and agreed during the Paris meeting”.

In the letter Mr. Seyidov wrote: “We are ready for cooperation with you regarding this or that report as a commitment to be fulfilled by any member state”. Later, in this letter addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Mr. Christopher Chope, on 5 March 2012, Mr. Samad Seyidov informed him that Mr. Strässer would be issued a visa and every condition would be created for his visit to Azerbaijan as agreed. But later, under various pretexts, Mr. Strässer refused to visit Azerbaijan.

The discussions were continued at the April-May 2012 meetings of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. In spite of the written appeal by the Committee members, the Chairman and Secretariat of the Committee did not put to the vote the issue on dividing the reports at the Committee meeting on 24 April 2012. Instead, an absurd proposal, allowing Mr.Strässer to prepare a report without visiting Azerbaijan, was put to the vote though the Committee members did not back it. Nevertheless, though absurd, PACE Secretary General Wojciech Sawicki said Mr. Strässer would prepare the report.

Of course, such developments of events concerned not only Azerbaijan, but also other countries. So, in order to handle this problem, 28 members of the Committee sent an appeal to the Chairman of this committee, Mr. Christopher Chope, and the secretariat on 10 May 2012.

In their appeal, they drew attention to the importance of dividing the report, titled “Reconsideration of the issue of political prisoners” at the Committee meeting, slated for 21 May 2012, into two different reports for defining political prisoners and follow-up to the issue of political prisoners. They requested that the issue be included on the agenda and be put to vote.

We should note that according to the procedural rules, any motion, backed by one third or more members of the Committee, is to put to vote. Despite the working majority, PACE Secretary General Mr. Wojciech Sawicki as well as the head of the Secrtariat of the Committee, Mr. Andrew Drzemcewski, and the deputy head of the Secretariat, Mr. Gunter Schirmer, tried to prevent the issue from being included on the agenda. However, due to majority, they were helpless and were obliged to put the issue on the agenda on 21 May.

At the outset of the meeting, Strässer distributed a letter among the Committee members, calling them against dividing the report into two parts. He promised all the members that he would add a chapter on the criteria and the definition to the “combined” report and that there was no need for a separate report. During the discussions, a number of German MPs and others took the floor to support Mr. Strässer.

However, several members of the Committee called on their colleaugues to demonstrate impartiality, to put an end to discrimination, and most of all, to support the appeal of the Committee members for the separation of the reports in order to make real progress in the solution of the issue. They insisted on putting to vote the proposal on the division of the reports. Finally, the chairman put to vote the motion on the division of the report.

The voting resulted in 21 votes in favor, and 15 votes against. Thus, as a result of long-standing and intensive struggle, it was decided to divide the report on definition and the follow-up to the issue of political prisoners.

No doubt that according to this decision of the Committee, the criteria on the notion of the political prisoners applicaple to all member states of the Council of Europe should be prepared and a resolution should be passed at a plenary session. Only after this step, the follow-up to the issue of the alleged political prisoners in member states could be realized without any discrimination. Therefore, the decision of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, dated from 21 May 2012, was assesed as a new chapter in the Council of Europe. With the adoption of this decision, there appeared hopes that double standards and biased policy, applied to Azerbaijan without any legal basis in the absence of the criteria on “political prisoner”, would end.

However, the initial reaction of Mr. Strässer, who reacted to the decision angrily, was strange: After being defeated in the voting, he unexpectedly said that he would submit each of thereport separately to the Committee in June – within four weeks! Many of the committee members was surprised by this decision of the rapporteur. Thus, it seemed frivolous to prepare two reports within a few weeks on such an important issue being the topic of discussions for five years in PACE.

We should underline that according to the procedural rules,Mr. Strässer had to present his reports to the Committee during the June session as his mandate expired prior to the June 2012 session. Therefore, the reports prepared by Mr. Strässer wereincluded on the agenda of the 26 June 2012 meeting of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights.

The meeting of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, slated for 26 June 2012, was very significant from the point of view of defining the “political prisoners” issue by PACE members, for the demonstration of an unbiased approach to the situation in Azerbaijan, and finally, for the clarification of the issue to what extent they were ready for transparent and open discussion. On that day, the report on “Definition of political prisoners” was discussed in the morning meeting of the Committee. It was a rather sharp and emotional discussion with the involvement of two rival groups with almost the same influ ence.

Expressing their concerns about facts, figures and relevant arguments, some MPs defended us. However, the influential anti-Azerbaijani lobby insisted that everybody to silently listen to the rapporteur. Members of the Socialist Group got a clear message from their German-speaking Swiss leader that they should support the reports and any critical opinion would threaten their personal political future. Some of them complained about such blackmail, but they were afraid to raise their voices.

Nevertheless, some members defended a fair approach against double standards, gave political support, and undoubtedly, took a great personal risk and spoke against the reports. As a result of voting, the report was passed with 26 votes in favor, and 22 votes against.

The approval of the criteria by a narrow margin of votes demonstrated a big discrepancy inside the Council on Europe on this vital issue. In general, key decisions were usually passed by the majority of votes, though this was not the case this time. This indicated the controversial nature of the criteria, proposed by the rapporteur, and consequently, the difficulty of their application.

Unfortunately, the criteria on “definition of political prisoners” proposed by the rapporteur in his report were based on the work of the group of independent experts set up by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in 2001 and were repeating the temporary criteria proposed by them.

As mentioned above, independent experts suggested the criteria prepared on the basis of Norgaard’s Principles, used as an integral part of the national reconciliation mission in Namibia and later in the South African Republic in 1988-1989. At that time, those countries were in the grip of ethnic and racial confrontation.

However, the situation in the space of the Council of Europe and in Azerbaijan was radically different from that in those countries and for the lack of division in society, there was no need for national reconciliation initiatives. Therefore, these criteria were completely inappropriate for the European countries.

In general, the majority of MPs assessed Mr. Strässer’s report on political prisoners as a ridiculous document superficial, prepared hastily without meeting current realities. Even proposals were made repeatedly to remove this report entirely from the discussions.

The 26 June 2012 meeting of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human rights discussed the report on “The follow-up to the issue of political prisoners in Azerbaijan” presented by Mr.Strässer. One of the points worth attention was that the criteria,which were not yet adopted, were used in the report for the follow-up to the issue of the political prisoners in Azerbaijan. This was an unprecedented incident.

Political prisoners were defined on the basis of legally fictional criteria. The rapporteur attached a list of 89 persons to the report in order to create an impression that people were arrested illegally in Azerbaijan. However, many of the people on the list were not already in prison. The list included names of several extremists who made open calls for the violent change of power in Azerbaijan.

It was very strange that the rapporteur of the organization, described as the fortress of the democratic values, gave official support to persons who wanted to overthrow a young democracy. Moreover, in Mr. Strässer’s report, the names of the people, who were not considered political prisoners by the independent experts group, established by the CoE Secretary General in 2001, accused of grave crimes, murder, terrorism, kidnapping, robbery, narcotics and other dangerous crimes, were presented as the political prisoners. Mr. Strässer acknowledged that “as it could be the last chance for the release of such persons, I included their names in the joint list of the presumed political prisoners”.

What was strange in his report was that Mr. Strässer was making personal statements on each individual court case under consideration of our national judiciary or the European Court in Strasbourg. However, in the civilized world, in line with a common practice, no interference in the judicial proceedings is unacceptable. Not a single member state of the Councilof Europe would accept such an undemocratic approach.

Many Western European MPs, seeing Mr. Strässer’s biasedposition and indeed his unfair report, supported Azerbaijan’s position, though it was a very difficult struggle. During the discussions, both sides were demonstrating very emotional approaches. At the end of the day, the difference between votes was little (25-23) and this was very exceptional case in the Council of Europe as such reports were always adopted with the vast majority, even with a consensus.

In general, MPs were under enormous pressure to vote in favor of a partial and unfair report that did not offer a possible solution. It was difficult to defeat such biased positions of some leaders, who have gone far by blackmailing their colleagues. Those, who thoroughly studied the reports and were courageous enough to resist pressure, supported us by showing common sense and logic.

Due to pressures, some of the parliamentarians, who were supporting us, did not attend the morning session and several others missed the afternoon session. With regard to the last report, we gained the upper hand. In the meantime, some pro-Strässer MPs and staff of the secretariat began to make phone calls to other members, who were not attending the discussions; neutral MPs changed their positions under duress; a leader of a political group put pressure on group members and instructed them to support Mr. Strässer’s report; and the voting was falsified by the Secretariat.

All these factors changed the course of voting. Thus, many of our opponents, without embarking on the discussion and with out being aware of the report, blindly followed the instructions of political leaders who called them to vote for Mr. Strässer’s report and entered the meeting hall when the voting was under way. No permission was allowed to express personal views and a number of MPs told us that our position was quite right, though, they were obliged to support Mr. Strässer; otherwise, their political future would come under a threat.

Besides, we should note that ahead of the discussions, international NGOs, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, Human Rights House Foundation, Freedom Now and Index: The voice of free expression addressed the Committee members, calling them to support Mr.Strässer’s reports.

Undoubtedly, addressing the Committee members ahead of the discussions and distortion of the realities about Azerbaijan was an integral part of the organized campaign against our country. This was a form of political pressure on European MPs. A similar address was sent to the members of the Monitoring Committee on 27 June 2012 by the abovementioned organizations.

It is clear that the decision of the Committee on Political Affairs and Human Rights, dated from 26 June 2012, was not a good example of passing a democratic decision. This sample of the decision making was part of a program to offset the influence of relatively small member states of the Council of Europe by some power centers.

Lastly, a struggle was underway in the Council of Europe for a long time on the issue of political prisoners and it resembled a struggle for positions. While in January and May 2012, proAzerbaijani forces with impartial position were prevailing and during the June session, Mr. Strässer and his anti-Azerbaijani allies gained the upper hand. However, the key phase of this struggle was to come at the October session in 2012 and in the January session in 2013.

Forces uninterested in constructive and sustainable cooperation between Azerbaijan and the Council of Europe were regularly trying to raise the so-called “problem of political prisoners in Azerbaijan” at the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. Finally, after attempts by a group of MPs with prejudiced and biased positions towards Azerbaijan, trying to find faults, the issue was again brought back on the agenda in 2008. However, a group of parliamentarians mainly from the western European countries signed a document, stating about the impossibility of identifying political prisoners without the criteria, and submitted it to the Bureau. The document was sent to the Bureau, to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights and was again referred to the Bureau and to the Committee.

The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights has always treated such documents biasedly. Referring to the Resolutions 1272 (2002) and 1359 (2004), the committee was claiming about the existence of the criteria for identifying the political prisoners. As I mentioned above, those resolutions did not contain any criteria and therefore, a reference to those documents was absolutely wrong, and the information was wide of the truth.

Finally, in 2008, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights took into account that the notion of a “political prisoner” was not determined in international law, it was not enshrined in the official documents of the Council of Europe, as well as this notion was not used in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. And it concluded that there was no legal basis for the allegations, such as a “problem of the political prisoners in Azerbaijan” and that it was important to prepare and pass a relevant document and criteria of the Council of Europe that could be applied to all member states on the issue of the “political prisoners”. To this end, the PACE Bureau adopted a decision. The decision stipulated the preparation of the criteria in 2009 for defining the notion of the “political prisoners” within the framework of the Council of Europe, and postponing the activities of the rapporteurs, appointed to member states on the problem of political prisoners until the adoption of a relevant document.

Regrettably, the problem of the so-called “political prisoners” was again raised at the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights in early 2009. At its meeting on 24 March 2009, the Committee reached a decision on the appointment of a special rapporteur on the issue of political prisoners in Azerbaijan despite the above-mentioned decision of the Bureau. In accordance with the decision of the Committee, German MP Christoph Strässer was appointed a special rapporteur on the issue of the political prisoners in Azerbaijan. At its meeting on 16 December 2009, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights vested Mr.Christoph Strässer with a mandate to prepare a set of criteria for the notion of the political prisoners. Along with this, the Committee decided to merge the abovementioned two reports. Accordingly, the issue of the political prisoners within the Council of Europe became dependent on the position of a single parliamentarian.

Thus, by the decisions of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Mr. Christoph Strässer was vested with two mandates: the first mandate – the special rapporteur was on the issue of political prisoners in Azerbaijan; the second mandate was on the preparation of the criteria for defining the political prisoners. In other words, Mr. Christoph Strässer was tasked with preparing a report on political prisoners in Azerbaijan based on his own criteria. This was the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in PACE on the issue of the political prisoners, full of harsh, groundless and biased accusations.

So, without paying a fact-finding mission to Azerbaijan and without familiarizing himself with the situation in the country, Mr. Strässer drew up a memorandum, titled “The follow-up to the issue of political prisoners in Azerbaijan and the definition of political prisoners”, and submitted it to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on 17 June 2010 (AS/Jur (2010) 28).

The memorandum consisted of four sections, 22 paragraphs and an appendix. In the first section of the Memorandum (Introduction), the author explained his intention to start the implementation of the two mandates under which he was appointed a rapporteur on 24 March and 16 December 2009 respectively. He noted that he would give “an overview of a long and painful history of the problem of political prisoners in Azerbaijan”.

He further noted that he would recall the existence of an “applicable and well-recognized definition of the political prisoners” and on this basis, he would finish the report by building his activity in a planned manner “in favor of the so-called political prisoners in Azerbaijan”. In the memorandum, Mr. Strässer stated that he would ask the Committee to agree with the merger of the two mandates and inform the Bureau of this, as well as to “reaffirm the definition of the notion as put forward by the experts as the basis for the work to be carried out in Azerbaijan”. As we can see, Mr. Strässer laid bare his intention in the first item of the report and de-facto jumped to a hasty conclusion he was expected to reach at the end of the report.

To put it differently, Mr. Strässer confirmed that he would act on the basis of the wording provided by the independent experts of the Council of Europe in paragraph 3 of their respective report with regard to accepting the general definition for the notion of the “political prisoners”, namely, “everything depends on the function the definition should serve”.

What can be said about the essence of this wording? Mr. Strässer was saying that the report would be prepared based on aforethought algorithm that serves specific purposes. According to Mr. Strässer’s algorithm, it is important to achieve concrete results without considering any legal norms and objectivity. That is, regardless of how the input is changed, the output of the function should consist of the following:

a.  The criteria, proposed by the independent experts of the Council of Europe for the notion of the “political prisoners”, are understandable and acceptable;

b.  The existence of the political prisoners in Azerbaijan is outof question;

c.  Both mandates should be merged.

Thus, Mr. Strässer did not use any creative or original idea when drafting a memorandum; actually, he was biased and partial. Indeed, the Memorandum contains discussions and documents on political prisoners in Azerbaijan within the framework of the Council of Europe and points out a number of critical moments over the failure to tackle problems contained in the PACE documents.

In the fourth paragraph, Mr. Strässer recalls that since Azerbaijan’s membership of the Council of Europe, PACE has considered the issue of the political prisoners in Azerbaijan for four times (January 2002, June 2003, January 2004 and June 2005). He drew attention to the Resolution 1457 (2005) adopted on this issue, that is, the Assembly “resolutely reaffirms its principled position that inmates recognized as the political prisoners must be released”.

He also notes that as “determined by the independent experts, by releasing the three remaining political prisoners or by ordering a retrial or through an appeal court as proposed by the Azerbaijani authorities, there is a need to open their court cases to be effectively considered by the European Court of Human Rights”. Later, at the end of the fourth paragraph, Mr. Strässer stated that in the Resolution 1457 (2005), the Assembly welcomed “the undertaking by the Azerbaijani authorities to make use of every legal tools (amnesty, re-trial of criminal cases by courts of higher instances, a conditional release or a release on health grounds, pardon) to settle this problem”. Also in the fifth paragraph of the report, he wrote that”… no pardon decree has been issued since March 2007 despite promises”.

This information of Mr. Strässer was wide of the mark since Azerbaijan honored its commitments and regularly issued pardon decrees and amnesty acts. In 2010 alone, Azerbaijan issued two pardon decrees (17 March and 29 December 2010). Under the pardon decree from March 2010, 62 convicts and 7 people with restriction on freedom were freed from the unserved part of their punishments; the life sentence of a prisoner was replaced with 20-year imprisonment; and one person was freed from fine.

At the same time, Qanimat Zahid, imprisoned editor-in-chief of Azadliq newspaper, was released under this pardon decree; and a woman facing a deferred sentence was also released. Along with the mentioned pardon decree, in 2007, an amnesty act was issued to commemorate the 84th birthday anniversary of Heydar Aliyev, and under this act, over 9,000 inmates were set free.

Thus, with his memorandum, Strässer had seriously damaged the international image of the Azerbaijani state by giving false and misleading information about Azerbaijan to PACE members and, in general, to the public of the Council of Europe member states. He grossly violated the right of the public of the member states of the Council of Europe to receive accurate information.

The point here is that whether Mr. Strässer has demonstrated purposeful, biased position in disseminating such information,or he has been unaware of the processes in the country as a special rapporteur. Thus, if the rapporteur insists on spreading false and misleading information by demonstrating purposeful and biased position, then he is responsible for such activities. On the other hand, if the rapporteur spreads false and misleading information without being aware of the processes taking place in the country, then he did not take seriously the mandate entrusted to him as the rapporteur and could not cope with this mandate.

In the memorandum, a serious moment that draws particular attention to was to what extent Strässer is “objective” and “impartial” in his considerations. Thus, in the second item, the rapporteur notes that the history of the political prisoners issue in Azerbaijan coincides with the time of the accession talks of the country together with Armenia to the Council of Europe, which entered into force on 25 January 2001. Mr. Strässer further emphasized that “in order to overcome member states’ resistance to Azerbaijan and Armenia’s memberships of the organization, a compromise solution was found”.

In the phrase, after the word “Armenia” and at the footnote, he wrote: “Armenia also belonged here; however, a pocket of court cases were rapidly resolved; for this reason, as appropriate, hereinafter, I will only refer to the political prisoners in Azerbaijan”. It’s very interesting, isn’t it?! It seems that Mr.Strässer was either completely asleep at the switch of the real situation in Armenia, or he deliberately fed the PACE members and the European public with false information.

Actually, the real situation in Armenia was not so at all. The situation in Armenia totally opposed Mr. Strässer’s opinion. Armenia’s well-known human rights defender Mikael Danielyan, in his interview in March 2001, said: Human rights, as set forth in all 30 Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are violated in Armenia; the judiciary in the republic is corrupt from top to bottom; actually, judges are not independent; they are not dependent only on the laws; throughout the court processes, there are armed security guards in the courtrooms; the police arbitrariness knows no bounds; the fates of detainees in custodies are decided there; decisions are namely adopted there; almost all detainees are subjected to psychological and physical pressures. (Ekho newspaper, No. 24, 1 March 2001) Perhaps, Mr. Strässer was unaware of such deplorable situation in Armenia under Kocharyan’s rule. In my opinion, it is impossible for Mr. Strässer not to be aware of the use of weapons against peaceful demonstrators, alleging the falsification of the 2008 presidential election in Armenia; about the deaths of some 10 people under official information; the detention of hundreds of Armenian citizens due to participation in peaceful protests or being members of opposition parties and their imprisonment to various terms by the courts.

In Strässer’s memorandum, considerations of the Council of Europe’s independent experts regarding the notion of “political prisoners” were repeated as they were, and no new principal approach was sounded. He emphasized that unless the respondent State succeeds in establishing that the person concerned is detained in full conformity with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights, the person will have to be regarded as a political prisoner. Mr. Strässer claimed that the above rule was established by the European Court of Human Rights. He stated that the burden of a proof should be with the state where an alleged political prisoner is.

In this regard, it should be noted that the burden of a proof is on a plaintiff, not on a defendant, and this is one of the fundamental principles of the law. What can be said regarding Mr.Strässer’s views as “unless… succeeds in establishing that the person concerned is detained in full conformity with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights asinterpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, the person will have to be regarded as a political prisoner”? There is no provision in the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights that the person imprisoned in violation of the Convention’s provisions should be regarded as a political prisoner. This Court does not make use of this notion at all.

As a whole, Mr. Strässer did not propose any new ideas and principles when drafting the memorandum. He demonstrated prejudice and biased position and tried to lend legitimacy to discrimination of Azerbaijan among 47 member states of the Council of Europe. Moreover, he put forward a proposal contradicting the principle of the “rule of law”.

Proceeding from the criteria defined in the report of the independent experts, on 24 January 2002, PACE passed a Resolution 1272, titled “Political prisoners in Azerbaijan”. A number of individual court cases (Iskandar Hamidov, Alikram Hummatov, Rahim Qaziyev and others), who were included in the list of presumed political prisoners at the time when Azerbaijan was admitted to the Council of Europe, were discussed in the resolution without any definition or criteria. No criteria with regard to the notion of the “political prisoners” found its reflection in the resolution. Though the report prepared by the independent experts reflected the criteria to define the existence of the political prisoners both in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the PACE Resolution 1272 (2002) related only to Azerbaijan. No resolution regarding Armenia was passed either earlier or later.

During the Assembly’s June session in 2003, a member of the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Belgian MP Georges Clerfayt presented a report on the political prisoners in Azerbaijan. In his report Georges Clerfayt expressed biased position towards Azerbaijan. He said that Azerbaijan did not fulfill its commitments taken with regard to the issue of the “political prisoners” at the time of admission to the Council of Europe, and described persons convicted for different crimes as the “political prisoners”.

I should note that on 16 January 2001, an act of amnesty was adopted in connection with Azerbaijan’s admission to the Council of Europe as a full member. Many people remember that about 2,300 inmates were released from detention facilities, 800 inmates saw their penalties commuted, 4,400 people were released before they were officially charged and investigations against 1,300 were dropped by the investigation bodies and courts. Moreover, the president of Azerbaijan signed a pardon decree, dated from 17 June 2003. Under this decree, 106 prisoners were released and the vast majority of the prisoners, recognized as “political prisoners” by human rights organizations, were among the pardoned. By and large, after Azerbaijan’s admission to the Council of Europe, 527 out of 716 prisoners, considered as political prisoners by some non-governmental organizations, were released. However, the report by Clerfayt did not make mention of them.

The Azerbaijani delegation said that the report on the “political prisoners” on the agenda was controversial, adding that it was aimed at influencing the pre-election situation. During the discussions, the majority of MPs in their speeches underlined that ClerfayPs report was biased and superficial in nature and did not correspond to the criteria of the independent experts, and that the position of the rapporteur and the opinion of the group of experts contradicted. Finally, considering that the report on the issue of the “political prisoners” in Azerbaijan was controversial, PACE took a decision to send the report back to the committee for revision.

In 2004, PACE adopted the second resolution on the political prisoners in Azerbaijan. The list of the alleged political prisoners submitted by some NGOs ahead of Azerbaijan’s admission to the Council of Europe as a full member contained court cases until 1 January 2001. The European Convention on Human Rights came into force in Azerbaijan on 15 April 2002 and since then the people of Azerbaijan have gained the right to apply to the European Court of Human Rights.

From 1 January 2001 to 15 April 2002, NGOs submitted a list of persons alleged to be the political prisoners. The names of these prisoners were not included in the list drafted ahead of Azerbaijan’s admission to the Council of Europe as a full member. Therefore, it remained open under which criteria those inmates were defined as the political prisoners. In order to bridge the gap, the criteria, drawn up by the independent experts in the PACE Resolution 1359 (2004), were approved to keep in force so that to apply them to the people convicted between 1 January 2001 to 15 April 2002. It should be noted that no criteria were presented in the Resolution 1359 (2004) as was the case with the Resolution 1272 (2002).

The next debates at PACE on the political prisoners issue in Azerbaijan were held in June 2005. This issue slightly slowed down after the detailed discussion of a report by Malcolm Bruce, the rapporteur on the issue of political prisoner in Azerbaijan. Malcolm Bruce quitted his post as a rapporteur after concluding the absence of the problem pertaining to the political prisoners in Azerbaijan. Thus, there remained no need to appoint a new rapporteur on Azerbaijan over the factitious issue.

Though the rapporteur post on the issue of political prisoner in Azerbaijan was eliminated, the Azerbaijani government was trying to have this issue solved legally forever, and to this end, on 11 June 2005, it came forward with an initiative of setting up a working group. The group involved government representatives and human rights defenders. Later, this working group continued functioning as the Working Group on Human Rights.

Azerbaijan adopted an act of amnesty and 16 acts of pardon from the end of 2003 to February 2011. These decisions were applied to approximately 10,000 prisoners. Throughout this period, cases of many prisoners, who were alleged to be political prisoners, were re-examined by courts and set free.

In general, by referring to the legal means in question, nurous inmates, presumed to be political prisoners, were released. Moreover, discussions on the judges’ activities were continuously held at the Judicial-Legal Council in order to prevent legal wrongdoings, committed by judges when examining this or that criminal case to avoid the emergence of new prisoners who could be defined as “political prisoners”. Under the recommendations of the Judicial-Legal Council, by 2011 over 100 judges were subjected to different penalties, over 30 judges were recommended not to continue their activities and duties of over 10 judges were terminated ahead of time.

Furthermore, in 2005, Azerbaijan played host to international conferences with the participation of up to 70 experts from 30 countries, including representatives of PACE, the OSCE PA, the European Parliament and the UN on the issue of the “political prisoners” and in 2008 on “The protection of political rights in Azerbaijan – new criteria”. The undefined international and legal nature of the notion of the “political prisoners”, the absence of this term in the international documents, including in universally-recognized official documents of the Council of Europe, as well as the non-use of this notion in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights were underlined in the resolutions and statements of these international conferences. Though those resolutions and statements, prepared with the participation of numerous international experts, were submitted to PACE, the Council of Europe did not react to these documents.

However, the presumed issue of the “political prisoners” was artificially and regularly turned into a subject of discussions in the run up to the presidential and parliamentary elections in the country, as well as ahead of PACE sessions. Both inside and outside the country, some circles used it against Azerbaijan as a tool of political pressure in the form of a large-scaled and biased campaign.

For the sake of preventing such biased campaigns and to familiar the public with the gist of the problem, several Azerbaijani NGOs and “the council on the issue of political prisoners”, made up of over 70 NGOs, set up a group of experienced experts. This group of experts examined the criminal cases of over 100 prisoners recognized as the “political prisoners” by the Council of Europe, and came to an unequivocal conclusion that there was no legal ground to recognize those persons as the “political prisoners”. The group even found out that among the persons recognized as the “political prisoners”, there were persons who had committed crimes, such as kidnapping, terrorism, a coup and other violent offences. The heads of those NGOs informed the leadership of the Council of Europe about the unveiled facts and drew these facts to the attention of MPs of the Council of Europe at bilateral and multilateral meetings.

Moreover, those organizations were regularly addressing the leadership and MPs of the Council of Europe with statements. Those statements underlined that regardless of being a member of any political party or a movement, or a senior official, everybody should be held responsible for crimes he/she committed. And politicizing this issue contradicts the rule of law which is the main factor in the formation of a democratic, law-governed state and civil society. Probes into several criminal cases or mistakes made by investigators or judges in trials of crimes do not give any grounds to recognize those offenders as the “political prisoners”. These issues should be solved by legal rather than political means. If somebody is dissatisfied with decisions made by the national legal-judicial system, he/she may go to the European Court of Human Rights.

What else were underlined in these statements? In the absence of any universally accepted legal criteria or international legal documents, it is discrimination to allege the existence of a problem of the political prisoners only in Azerbaijan among 47 member states; and the appointment of a special rapporteur on the political prisoners in Azerbaijan contradicts the international legal norms. Furthermore, this complies with neither the common European values, nor the principles of the Council of Europe. It undermines the reputation of the Council of Europe.

Azerbaijan has also remained loyal to its tradition of resolving the problem of the political prisoners unbiasedly and impartially within the framework of the Council of Europe. Since the membership of the Council of Europe, the Azerbaijani delegation and the government of Azerbaijan have regularly raised the issue of absence of a legal document, envisaging the criteria for political prisoners.

Azerbaijan has been urging the Council of Europe that the clarification and investigation of this issue is impossible unless a legal document and criteria are defined. However, for its part, the Council of Europe has always applied double standards and showed biased position towards Azerbaijan in this regard, appointed a rapporteur only to Azerbaijan out of the 47 member states and held official Baku responsible for this problem and paid no heed to its demands.